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1962/10/16

46. CIA Memorandum, "Probable Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba," 16 October 1962

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MINORANDUM: Probable Soviet MIRM Sites in Cube

- 1. Photography of 1h October 1502 has disclosed two arcies in the Sizara del Romario nametain about 5 nan- wart southwest of Havana which appear to contain Howlet Mills in the entry singers of Suplement. A third zero, shout three and ten miles cent of the first trop, rempetively, appears to be a military amongszent. The first site includes 1h large tents, 15 manlier tents and 15 weblokes of a number of different types. The most significant whiches at this site are six central-covered trailers of 80 Jest in overall laught which are of the general site and configuration of those used to transport the Soviet Sci-3 (700 n.m. hallistin missile) and Sci-4 (100 n.m. ballistic missile). These trailers, of which sight more are located at the movem site, are believed to be larger than those required to transport that Sci-2 (300 n.m. ballistic missile).
- 2. The second site is 5 n.m. cost of the first, and in edition to the sight trailers, contains four specially configured vehicles or pisces of equipment which could be used for minufic curretion in a final convicement. At the time of photography, one of the trailers use in junctposition with our of those possible eroctors. This rice also contains 17 large tents, 20 mail tents, 10 large trucks, 16 small tracks and 12 unidentified pieces of large equipment. He other minufile associated equipment, much as instrumentation or propellant storage, have been detected. In facility to store nuclear varionals can be identified at any of these three installations.







3. The dimensions of the traditors indicate that either the Se-3 or Sel-bellistic insight system are involved. Both of these systems are road-wohile and on be deployed with no heavy construction werk for launch peeds, etc. Roth tith EF-3 and Sel-b are single stage vehicles which will curry a 3,000 lb. warned to a nextinan range of 700 nm. and 100 nm. respectively. The Se-3 system requires liquid crygon as an ordinat, while the Sel-bergloy establist propellates. From a logication and operational prandpoint it would be more all the sel-berglos that the Sel-berglos startiles of these selections of the selection of

4. We do not have evidence from chigping coverages or other courses to induce definitely when the missile units exrived in Cabe. From the extensivenous of the present estimity, we have being my have began to exrive during September. At the time of the 10 October photography, a column of truche and equipment was visible on a road within one of the installations. Although we cannot be sure, it can still be that the bulk of the personnel and equipment was visible of a road problem of the time of the personnel and equipment was subject from the UGHS as no interpreted road mobile unit, was a subject from the UGHS as no interpreted road mobile unit, operational roadiness could have be got a great of the control of the cont

insolies to thus tenders' decision to deplay ballistic misciles to their deterentation to debre any active US intervention to weaken or overtheen the Cestro regime, which they apparently regard as likely and imminent. This entitles of US intentions prompted Monoor's statement of 11 September which warned that an attack no Chuk wuld lend to a general muclear conflict. The Euricks presumably believe that the presence of those unfailter, which they expect would that the presence of those unfailter, which they expect would have the total contract the costs and river to the cost of the US of the Cost of





ANNEX: Strategic Considerations

1. In weighing their decision to install ballistic missiles in Cabe, the Soyler leaders must have considered the allitary utility of these weapons with and without nuclear warheads, the targets in the US and elisabhere which they could reach, and the strategic value of deploying missile forces of various sizes in Cabe.

2. Because of their type of guidance and relative inaccuracy, ballistic missiles have utility against fixed targets of known location, and not against such targets as conveys or naval forces at sea. The Soviet 700 and 1,000 n.m. missiles, whose CEP's are estimated to be in the 1 to 1.5 u.m. range, could conceivably be employed with NB warheads against large military contors and urban areas. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would see any advantage in deployment for this purpose, but they might regard this threat as contribution to the deterrence of Latin American support for US or Cuban refugee operations against the Castro regime.

3. Deployed 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles with nuclear warhoads would augment Soviet strategic striking power by virtue of their ability to reach a number of Assorican targets the wheads having yields which are not significantly present has some of currons Soviet ICEM's. From thee present has some of curron's Soviet ICEM's. From thee present has some and statem US term significant and under warhoads could reach eastern US term significant and the under a calculutge Savanneh and New Orleans, including 1 7 SC bomber and tanker bases and at least one important mayel has (The 550 n.m missiles could reach bomber bases in Plorida, of which there are only two.) The 1,100 n.m. missile would threaten a much more significant number of critical willitary targets, including 18 SAC bomber and tanker bases, an ICEM base, and three major naval bases. In addition, such targets as the Panama Canal and US bases as fur east as Puerto Rice could be reached. Both of these missiles have ranges sufficient to reach many US population, industrial and administrative center-including, in the case of the 1,100 n.m. missile, washington, D.C. Installations of importance to the US atomic energy and space programs also would be within range of Cuban-based 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles.

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46. (Continued)

